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Abstract
We investigate the influence of the update dynamics on the evolution of cooperation. Three of the most
studied games in this area are used: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Snowdrift and the Stag Hunt. Previous studies
with the Prisoner’s Dilemma game reported that less cooperators survive with the asynchronous version
of the game than with the synchronous one. On the other side, studies with the Snowdrift game are not
conclusive about this subject. Based on simulations with these three games, played on different types of
networks and using different levels of noise in the choice of the next strategy to be adopted by the agents,
we conclude that, in general, an asynchronous dynamics favors the evolution of cooperation. Results
concerning the monotonicity of these models and their sensitivity to small changes in the synchrony rate
are also reported. This work is a contribution to a better understanding of the conditions under which
cooperation can emerge and how different parameters may influence this emergence.
Keywords: evolution of cooperation, spacial evolutionary games, update dynamics, asynchronism.
1. Introduction
In a dynamical system, the update method defines
the order in which the elements of the system are
updated. Synchronous updating has been the most
commonly used policy: at each time step, all the el-
ements of the system are updated at exactly the same
time. This practice has been widely questioned, the
argument being that perfect synchronism is absent
from the real world even in systems where synchro-
nization processes exist. Besides, it has been shown
that the dynamics of the system and the patterns gen-
erated, for example, in cellular automata, can be
significantly affected if an asynchronous updating
is used.1 ,2,3 The most common alternative to syn-
chronous updating is sequential updating, which is
a special case of asynchronism: at each time step,
exactly one element is updated. In order to use this
type of updating policy, it is necessary to define how
to choose the next element to be updated. It has been
shown that the order in which the elements are up-
dated may also influence the dynamics and the final
state of the system.4
Synchronous and sequential updating are, thus,
seemingly opposite ways of modeling the update dy-
namics of a dynamical system. In this paper we
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argue that these policies are both equally artificial
models and we investigate the consequences of us-
ing an update method that allows the exploration of
intermediate levels of asynchronism. We apply our
study to spatial evolutionary games which are par-
ticular examples of non-linear dynamical systems.
For biologists, it has been challenging to explain
the existence of cooperation in nature since, from
an evolutionary point of view, this type of behavior
is apparently less advantageous than selfish ones.5
This problem is also of central importance in so-
cial sciences6 and especially on the development
and maintenance of artificial societies,7 where it is
also relevant to study how cooperation can be pro-
moted and sustained. Spatial evolutionary games
are models that are used to study these phenomena.
In these models, a structured population of agents
interacts during several time steps through a given
game which is used as a metaphor for the type of
interaction that is being studied. The population is
structured in the sense that each agent can only in-
teract with its neighbors. The underlying structure
that defines who interacts with whom is called the
interaction topology. After each interaction session,
some or all the agents, depending on the update dy-
namics used, have the possibility of changing their
strategies. The strategy update process is modeled
using a so called transition rule that emulates the
fact that agents tend to adapt their behavior to the
context in which they live by imitating the most suc-
cessful agents they know. It can also be interpreted
as the selection step of an evolutionary process in
which the least successful strategies tend to be re-
placed by the most successful ones.
The discussion about the influence of the up-
date dynamics on spatial evolutionary games started
after the famous work by Nowak and May,8 who
showed that cooperation can emerge and be sus-
tained when the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is played
on a regular 2-dimensional grid by agents which al-
ways imitate their most successful neighbor. These
results were contested by Huberman and Glance,9
who argued against the synchronous updating that
was used. They also reported results of simulations
where cooperation was no longer sustainable when
a sequential updating was used. After this, Nowak
et al10 tested their model under several conditions,
including synchronous and sequential updating and
showed that cooperation can be maintained for many
different conditions, including sequential updating.
However, the results are presented through system
snapshot images of the model’s state, which render
it difficult to measure the way they are affected by
the modification from synchronous to sequential up-
dating. More recently, Newth and Cornforth,11 stud-
ied a similar scenario using various sequential up-
date methods besides the synchronous one. The au-
thors found that the synchronous updating scheme
supports more cooperators than the sequential ones.
In our previous work with the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, we found that asynchronous up-
dating supports, in general, more cooperators than
synchronous updating when the game is played
both in regular, small-world, random and scale-free
networks.12 ,13 We used a transition rule (see Sec.
2.4), which allows us to tune the level of noise
present in the strategy update process and found
that the influence of the updating dynamics depends
mainly on the noise level.14 We consider that there is
noise when an agent fails to imitate the strategy of its
most successful neighbor. We confirmed the results
of Newth and Cornforth, obtained for regular net-
works and the best-neighbor transition rule, but we
also found that asynchronous updating is detrimen-
tal to cooperation for very small noise values only.
That is, for the most part of the noise domain, asyn-
chronous updating supports more cooperators than
the synchronous policy. Also, as we go from regu-
lar to random networks, asynchronous updating be-
comes beneficial to cooperation even for very small
noise values. We also showed that the final outcome
of the model is basically the same whether a de-
terministic or a stochastic asynchronous method is
used.
In this paper we extend the study of the influ-
ence of the update method on spatial evolutionary
games. We present formal expressions for the sta-
tistical properties of the update method used. We
also propose measures to analyze the results ob-
tained with numerical simulations and we extend the
analysis to two more games: the Stag Hunt game
and the Snowdrift game. The Snowdrift game is
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mathematically equivalent to the Hawk-Dove and
the Chicken games. The different names are just a
consequence of the big variety of real situations for
which it can be used as a metaphor. There are at
least two good reasons to extend this study to games
other than the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The first one is
that both the similarities and the differences in the
results achieved with different games can help us in
the formulation of a better picture of the problem,
leading to a better understanding of the conditions
that allow the evolution of cooperation. The sec-
ond reason follows from the difficulty that field re-
searchers frequently experience in the evaluation of
the relative value of the payoffs involved in concrete
real situations.15 Different payoff relations may de-
fine different games and that reinforces the need to
experiment with several games.
We do not know any study about the influence
of the update method on the Stag Hunt game. In
what concerns the Snowdrift game, Tomassini et
al16 found that sequential updating supports less
cooperators than the synchronous policy when the
best-neighbor transition rule is used and that the op-
posite happens when a proportional transition rule
is used. However, these two transition rules are just
two particular cases of the noise level present in the
strategy update process, which prevents any conclu-
sion about the general influence of the update dy-
namics in this game. In Sec. 3.3 we will see that this
influence can be better understood if we systemat-
ically explore the noise level present in the agents’
decision process.
The paper is structured as follows: in Sec. 2 we
describe the model we used in the simulations and in
Sec. 3 we present and discuss the results. Finally, in
Sec. 4 some conclusions are drawn and future work
is advanced.
2. The Model
2.1. The games
In this section we describe the three games used in
this study: the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), the Snow-
drift (SD) and the Stag Hunt (SH) games.17 In all
the three games, players can only cooperate (C) or
defect (D). The payoffs are the following: R to each
player if they both play C; P to each if they both play
D; T and S if one plays D and the other C, respec-
tively. These games differ in the relations existing
between the payoff values: while in the PD game
these values must obey T > R > P > S, in the SD
game they must obey T > R > S > P and in the SH
game they must be such that R> T ! P> S. Given
these conditions, it follows that, in the PD game, D is
the best action to take regardless of the opponent’s
decision. In the SD and SH games the best action
depends on the opponent’s decision but, while in the
SD game the best thing to do is to take the oppo-
site action the opponent takes, in the SH game the
best is to take the same action as the opponent. For
practical reasons, it is common to rescale the payoffs
such that the games can be described by one param-
eter only.18 The PD’s payoffs are defined as R = 1,
T = b> 1 and S= P= 0, where b represents the ad-
vantage of D players over C ones when they play the
game with each other. In the SD game, payoffs are
defined as T = β ! 1, R = β − 1/2, S = β − 1 and
P = 0 which leads to a cost-to-benefit ratio of mu-
tual cooperation r = 1/(2β −1),0 " r " 1. Finally,
the payoffs for the SH game are defined as R = 1,
T = P = h,0 " h " 1 and S = 0. Tables 1-3 show
the payoff matrixes for the three games. On each
cell, the first and second values are the payoff of the
row player and the column player, respectively.
Table 1. Payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
C D
C 1, 1 0, b
D b, 0 0, 0
Table 2. Payoff matrix of the Snowdrift game.
C D
C β − 12 , β − 12 β −1, β
D β , β −1 0, 0
Table 3. Payoff matrix of the Stag Hunt game.
C D
C 1, 1 0, h
D h, 0 h, h
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2.2. The interaction topologies
We used two types of interaction topologies: small-
world networks (SWNs)19 and scale-free networks
(SFNs).20 In order to build SWNs, first a toroidal
regular 2D grid is built so that each node is linked
to its 8 surrounding neighbors by undirected links;
then, with probability φ , each link is replaced by an-
other one linking two randomly selected nodes. We
do not allow self or repeated links nor disconnected
graphs. Networks built this way have the property
that, even for very small φ values, the average path
length is much smaller than in a regular network,
maintaining a high clustering coefficient. Both these
properties are very commonly observed in real so-
cial systems. As φ → 1, we get random networks
with both small average path lengths and clustering
coefficients.
SFNs have a power law degree distribution
P(k) ∼ k−γ that is also very common in real social
networks. SFNs are built in the following way: the
network is initialized with m fully connected nodes.
Then, nodes are added, one at a time, until the net-
work has the desired size. Each added node is linked
to m already existing nodes so that the probability of
creating a link with some existing node i is equal to
ki
∑ j k j , where ki is the degree of i, that is, the number
of nodes to which it is connected. This method of
link creation is called preferential attachment, since
the more links a node has, the greater is the proba-
bility of creating links to it. This has the effect that
a small proportion of nodes has a big connectivity
while the larger part has a very low connectivity.
2.3. The update dynamics
On each time step, agents first play a one round
game with all their neighbors. Agents are pure
strategists which can only play C or D. After this in-
teraction stage, each agent updates its strategy with
probability α using a transition rule (see next sec-
tion). The update is done synchronously by all the
agents selected to engage in this revision process.
The α parameter is called the synchrony rate and
is the same for all agents. This type of update
mehtod is called asynchronous stochastic dynamics
(ASD).21 It allows us to cover all the space between
synchronous and sequential updating. When α = 1
we have a synchronous model, where all the agents
update at the same time. As α → 1n , where n isthe population size, the model approaches sequen-
tial updating, where exactly one agent updates its
strategy at each time step.
When ASD is used, the number of updating
agents on each time step is binomially distributed.
If we define α as an , where a " n, then the ex-pected value of active agents on each time step is
equal to a = αn with a corresponding variance of
a(1− an) = nα(1−α). The probability that an agent
x is chosen k times in v single steps is also binomi-
ally distributed, i.e.
P(x is chosen k times)=
(v
k
)(a
n
)k(
1− an
)v−k
. (1)
In Ref. 4 expressions are given for the expected
value E(X) and variance V(X) of the number X of
single steps between two updates of the same agent
under sequential dynamics (α = 1n ). Here, we gen-eralize these expressions for the more general case
of α = an . As in the sequential case, the expressionsfor X are the same as for the number Z of single
steps between an update of agent x and an update of
a given neighbor of x:
E(X) =
∞
∑
k=1
ian
(
1− an
)i−1
=
n
a =
1
α
, (2)
V (X) =
∞
∑
k=1
[i−E(X)]2an
(
1− an
)i−1
=
n
a(
n
a −1) =
1
α
(
1
α
−1). (3)
ASD models the fact that, at each moment, more
than one agent, but not necessarily all of them, may
update their strategy. Usually, asynchronism is un-
derstood as sequential updating. As an example, in
all the works mentioned above, asynchronous dy-
namics means sequential updating. However, the
real world seems to lie somewhere between synchro-
nism and sequentiality and, so, both types of updat-
ing dynamics can be considered as artificial. In a
Published by Atlantis Press 
  Copyright: the authors 
                  107
The Influence of the Update Dynamics on the Evolution of Cooperation
population of interacting agents, many decision pro-
cesses can occur at the same time but not necessar-
ily involving all the agents. If these were instanta-
neous phenomena we could model the update dy-
namics of the system as if they occurred one after
another but that is not usually the case. These pro-
cesses can take some time, which means that their
output is not available to other ongoing decision pro-
cesses. Even if we consider them as being instan-
taneous, the time that information takes to be trans-
mitted and perceived implies that their consequences
are not immediately available to other agents. As we
have seen above, ASD also models the fact that, at
each time step, the number of agents updating their
strategy is not always the same, which is a reason-
able assumption. Apart from these arguments, as we
will see in the following sections, the fact that the
α parameter allows us to explore intermediate levels
of asynchronism is also useful in the analysis of the
influence of the update dynamics.
2.4. The strategy update process
The strategy update process is done using a transi-
tion rule that models the fact that agents tend to im-
itate the most successful agents they know. In our
simulations, we used, the generalized proportional
transition rule (GP)10. Let Gx be the average payoff
earned by agent x, Nx be the set of neighbors of x and
cx be equal to 1 if x’s strategy is C and 0 otherwise.
According to this rule, the probability that an agent
x adopts C as its next strategy is
pC(x,K) = ∑i∈Nx∪x
ci(Gi) 1K
∑i∈Nx∪x(Gi)
1
K
, (4)
where K∈ ]0,+∞[ is the noise present in the strategy
update process. Noise is present in this process if
there is some possibility that an agent imitates strate-
gies other than the one used by its most success-
ful neighbor. Small noise values favor the choice
of the most successful neighbors’ strategies. Also,
as noise diminishes, the probability of imitating an
agent with a lower payoff becomes smaller. When
K → 0 we have a deterministic best-neighbor rule
such that i always adopts the best neighbor’s strat-
egy. When K = 1 we have a simple proportional
update rule. Finally, for K → +∞ we have random
drift where payoffs play no role in the decision pro-
cess. For the moment, our analysis considers only
the interval K ∈]0,1]. In this interval the decision
process is strongly guided by the payoffs earned by
the agents.
2.5. Simulation setup
All the simulations were done with populations of
50× 50 = 2500 agents, randomly initialized with
50% of Cs and 50% of Ds. When the system is
running synchronously, i.e., when α = 1, we let it
run during a transient period of 900 iterations. Af-
ter this, we let the system run during 100 more it-
erations and, at the end, we take as output the av-
erage proportion of cooperators during this period.
When α '= 1, the number of selected agents at each
time step may not be equal to the size of the popula-
tion and it may vary between two consecutive time
steps. In order to guarantee that these runs are equiv-
alent to the synchronous ones concerning to the total
number of individual updates, we let the system first
run until 900× 2500 individual updates have been
done. After this, we sample the proportion of coop-
erators during 100×2500 individual updates and we
average it by the number of time steps needed to do
these updates. Each simulation is a combination of
a specific game (parameters b, r or h for the PD, SD
and SH games, respectively), an interaction topol-
ogy (φ or m, for SWNs and SFNs, respectively), a
noise value K for the transition rule and a α value
defining the synchrony rate of the model. All the
possible combinations of the values shown in Table
4 were tested. For each combination, 30 runs were
made and the average of these runs is taken as the
output.
For each combination of the φ/m and K param-
eters, where φ/m means that φ or m should be used
depending on the type of interaction topology, we
produced a chart like the one of Fig. 1. Each line in
the chart is a combination of the φ/m, K and b/r/h
parameters and, for simplicity, for the rest of the pa-
per we will refer to this type of combination sim-
ply as a line. Since we tested with 8 K values, 5 φ
values, 3 m values and 11 b/r/h values, this gives
8×5+8×3= 64 of these charts and 64×11= 704
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lines per game. The statistical measures we used for
the analysis in the next section are based on lines
and charts as the one of Fig 1.
Table 4. Parameter values used in the simulations.
Parameter Values
b (PD) 1, 1.1, 1.2, ..., 1.8, 1.9, 2
r (SD) 0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.8, 0.9, 1
h (SH) 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, ..., 0.8, 0.85, 0.9
φ (SWNs) 0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 1
m (SFNs) 2, 4, 8
α (ASD) 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, ..., 0.8, 0.9, 1
K (noise) 0, 1/100, 1/10, 1/8, 1/6, 1/4, 1/2, 1
Fig. 1. Proportion of Cs for the PD game on SFNs with
m= 2 and with K = 1.
3. Results
We analyze three aspects of the results: the local
sensitivity of the model to α , which is a measure of
how much the proportion of C players changes when
α is changed by a small value; monotonicity, where
we verify if the proportion of cooperators changes
always in the same direction as we change α ; the
impact that the update dynamics has on the propor-
tion of cooperators that survive, where we answer
the question ”Is asynchronism beneficial or detri-
mental to the evolution of cooperation?”.
3.1. Local sensitivity
We compute two different quantities, maxStep and
step(0.9,1), in order to estimate the local sensitivity
of the model to α .21 Taking Fig. 1 as an example,
for each line, we make
maxStep = max(|C(α)−C(α−0.1)|), (5)
α = 1,0.9, ...,0.2
and
step(1,0.9) = |C(1)−C(0.9)|, (6)
where C(α) represents the proportion of coopera-
tors achieved with the given α value. The maxStep
quantity is an estimatiion of the model’s sensitivity
along all the α domain, while step(1,0.9) tells us
how sensitive the model is when we change from
perfect synchronism to a near synchronous updat-
ing.
Figs. 2, 3 and 4 show the sensitivity values, re-
spectively for the PD, SD and SH games, for all the
possible parameter combinations (lines) that were
simulated. For the three games, the most part of
the points are below 0.1, for both the maxStep and
step(0.9,1) coordinates. However, we can see that,
specially in the PD and the SH games, there are
some situations of big sensitivity. While in the
PD game these situations happen mainly for SFNs
(Fig. 1 has some examples of this), in the SD and
SH games there is no clear pattern about the influ-
ence of the interaction topology on the local sensi-
tivity. We can also see that in the PD and SD games,
the maxStep often has the same value as step(0.9,1)
(values in the chart’s diagonal). This happens 23.2%
and 52.8% of the times, respectively for the PD and
SD games. It means that the model is sensitive
mainly when we change from a synchronous to a
near synchronous regime. This result is specially
relevant because it suggests that if we are model-
ing a real situation where synchronization processes
are at play, we should not rely on results achieved
under perfect synchronism only and that we should
inspect the behavior of the model under a quasi-
synchronous regime.
Published by Atlantis Press 
  Copyright: the authors 
                  109
The Influence of the Update Dynamics on the Evolution of Cooperation
Fig. 2. maxStep and step(1,0.9) values for the PD game.
Fig. 3. maxStep and step(1,0.9) values for the SD game.
Fig. 4. maxStep and step(1,0.9) values for the SH game.
Finally, a word to say that, despite the fact that
the most part of the steps are below 0.1, there are
plenty of situations where the difference between
the level of cooperation achieved with α = 1 and
α = 0.1 is very significant. Again, Fig. 1 illustrates
this very well.
3.2. Monotonicity
The exploration of intermediate levels of asynchro-
nism allows us to verify if the level of cooperation
changes monotonically as we change α . In order to
assess the monotonicity of the model, for each line,
we compute the quantity
M=(
10
∑
ı=2
|C(0.1i)−C(0.1(i−1))|)− |C(1)−C(0.1)|,
(7)
where, again, C(α) is the level of cooperation
achieved with a given α value. M = 0 if a line is
monotonic. If a line is non-monotonic, the more and
larger fluctuations there are, the larger will M be.
Table 5 shows the average M values per phi/m and
K parameter combination for the SD game, which
is the one presenting the larger M values. We can
see that the most part of the values are equal or very
close to 0. This means that, essentially, the propor-
tion of cooperators changes monotonically with α
in the three games. This is an important result since
it means that, in general, the maximum influence
the update method may have in the evolution of co-
operation can be assessed by inspecting the output
achieved with α values near the extremes of the α
domain.
Table 5. Average M values for the SD game.
φ m
0 0.01 0.05 0.1 1 2 4 8
K
0 0.14 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03
1/100 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
1/10 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
1/8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1/6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1/4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1/2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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3.3. Is anyone favored by asynchronism?
Is asynchronism beneficial or detrimental to the evo-
lution of cooperation? In order to answer this ques-
tion, we first compute, for each line, the quantity
D=C(0.1)−C(1), (8)
which is the difference of the proportion of cooper-
ators achieved with α = 0.1 and α = 1. Positive or
negative D values mean, respectively, that asynchro-
nism supports more or less cooperators than syn-
chronism. It is possible to base the analysis on this
difference due to the result reported in the previous
section concerning the monotonic behavior of the
model. Tables 6, 7 and 8 show, respectively for the
PD, SD and SH games, the average D value for each
φ/m and K combination (we remember that each
such combination corresponds to a chart such as the
one of Fig. 1). We complement the D average val-
ues with bold numbers in situations where at least
one line with a negative D value exists.
Table 6. Influence of the update method in the PD game.
φ m
0 0.01 0.05 0.1 1 2 4 8
K
0 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.07
1/100 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.18 0.13 0.08 0.09
1/10 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.09
1/8 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.08 0.09
1/6 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.08
1/4 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.09
1/2 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.14
1 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.27 0.41 0.30 0.19
Table 7. Influence of the update method in the SD game.
φ m
0 0.01 0.05 0.1 1 2 4 8
K
0 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07
1/100 -0.09 -0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.06
1/10 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.04
1/8 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.05
1/6 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.05
1/4 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.05
1/2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.05
1 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.06
Table 8. Influence of the update method in the SH game.
φ m
0 0.01 0.05 0.1 1 2 4 8
K
0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03
1/100 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
1/10 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02
1/8 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02
1/6 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.03
1/4 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.02
1/2 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.03
1 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.04
Table 6 shows that negative D values exist for
very low noise values. This is coherent with the
results obtained in the above mentioned work by
Newth and Cornforth with the PD game. How-
ever, the table also shows that D is positive for the
most part of the noise domain and that it grows with
noise. This completely contradicts the established
idea that asynchronous updating supports less co-
operators than the synchronous one in this game.
Table 7 shows that the results for the SD game are
very similar to the ones obtained with the PD game,
however, with smaller absolute D values. This is
also coherent with the results obtained by Tomassini
et al (we recall that the best-neighbor and the pro-
portional transition rules used by these authors are
equivalent to the generalized proportional transition
rule, respectively, with K = 0 and K = 1). But, also
in this case, exploring several noise values allows
us to have a much better idea about how the update
method influences the evolution of cooperation. Fi-
nally, Table 8 shows that in the SH game an asyn-
chronous update always supports more cooperators
than the synchronous one.
We may, thus, conclude that, in general, asyn-
chronism is beneficial to the evolution of coopera-
tion. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that
asynchronism is detrimental for very unrealistic sit-
uations only, where noise levels are very low. In-
deed, another common feature to the three games is
the fact that, excepting some small fluctuations, the
benefit of asynchronism grows with noise.
There is, however, one significant difference in
how asynchronism affects the evolution of coopera-
tion in the three games which is not possible to iden-
tify only by inspecting tables 6-8. Thus, as Figs. 1
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and 5 illustrate, in the PD and SD games there are
several lines per chart for which cooperators and de-
fectors coexist. This is not the case with the SH
game, where Cs and Ds coexist only for a very small
number of the tested h values. For example, in the
chart of Fig. 6, Cs and Ds only coexist for h= 0.65.
Below this value only Cs survive and above it only
Ds survive. This is because for, the most part of the
h values, the game is too easy or to difficult for C
players, precluding any influence of the α parame-
ter. The few h values for which Cs and Ds survive
vary considerably (from 0.4 to 0.9) with the noise
level and the type of interaction topology, and this is
why we explore this interval instead of concentrat-
ing on a smaller h interval. Of course that, given a
specific φ/m and K combination, if we concentrate
on a smaller interval around h values where Cs and
Ds coexist, we will get a larger average D value. Just
to confirm this, we explored the h parameter around
0.65, from 0.6 to 0.7 by steps of 0.01 for the situ-
ation illustrated in Fig. 6. In this experiment, Cs
and Ds coexist for h values from 0.63 to 0.67 and
the average D value is 0.15, which is the double of
the average D value of Fig. 6. In what concerns the
interpretation of the values of Table 8 (SH game),
this means that we should be aware that, in situa-
tions where Cs and Ds coexist, the real influence of
asynchronism is substantially larger than the values
shown in Table 8. It also means, that for similar av-
erage D values, as in Figs. 5 and 6, the influence
in situations where Cs and Ds coexist is, in general,
larger for the SH game than for the PD and specially
the SD games.
The influence of asynchronism on the evolution
of cooperation is also affected by the interaction
topology, for the PD and the SD games. For these
two games, the benefit of asynchronism grows as φ
increases, on SWNs, and as m decreases, on SFNs
(see tables 6 and 7). Although we do not know yet
what are the mechanisms that lead to this pattern of
behavior and how they operate, we hypothesize that
it is related to the clustering coefficient of the inter-
action topology, which decreases for the two types
of network as φ and m, respectively, increase and
decrease. Another possibility would be the average
path length between the nodes. However, while the
average path length decreases on SWNs as we in-
crease the φ value, it decreases on SFNs as we de-
crease the value of m. More work must be done,
however, in order to confirm this, and to verify why
this pattern of behavior is absent from the SH game
as it seems to be.
Finally, we would like to stress that using an
update method able to cover all the space between
synchronous and near sequential updating, allows
a deeper analysis of the model being studied. It
allows, for example, the identification of exist-
ing phase transitions in the level of cooperation
achieved: often the proportion of Cs is 0 for α = 1
and it remains there until a given α = c value is
reached. Then, suddenly, the level of cooperation
starts to increase, sometimes in a significant way, as
α decreases from c to 0.1. For many of such situ-
ations c is very close or equal to 1 (see, for exam-
ple, Fig. 1). This may suggest that in these cases
the existence of some degree of cooperation is the
most probable outcome in the system being modeled
since it exists for almost the entire α domain. This
type of analysis is not possible if only the extremes
of the update dynamics’ space are explored, even in
situations where the model answers monotonically
to changes in the synchrony rate.
Fig. 5. Proportion of Cs for the SD game on SFNs with
m= 4 and with K = 1/8. The average D value is 0.082.
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Fig. 6. Proportion of Cs for the SH game on SWNs with
φ = 0.01 and with K = 1/4. Cs and Ds only coexist for
h= 0.65. The average D value is 0.082.
4. Conclusions and Future Work
The real world seems to lie somewhere between per-
fect synchronism and sequential dynamics. How-
ever, it is common practice to use only one of these
two types of update dynamics, rarely the two, in
the modeling and study of dynamical systems. Syn-
chronism, for example, is often used even in cases
where there is no evidence that synchronization pro-
cesses exist. In this paper we argued that interme-
diate levels of asynchronism should be used in the
study of dynamical systems. We studied the influ-
ence of the update method in spatial evolutionary
games, which are special cases of non-linear dynam-
ical systems used to study the evolution of coopera-
tion in many areas like, for example, biology, soci-
ology, economics and artificial societies.
In this work we used three of the most studied
games, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Snowdrift and
the Stag-Hunt games, and the asynchronous stochas-
tic dynamics update method, which allows the ex-
ploration of all the space between synchronous and
sequential updating. This update method allows the
study of some aspects as, for example, the local sen-
sitivity and the monotonicity of the system, that are
not possible to study if only synchronous and se-
quential updating are used. We found that, in gen-
eral, the three games are not very sensitive to small
changes in the synchrony rate. However, in a signi-
ficative number of situations, the games are sensitive
mainly when a change from a synchronous to a near
synchronous regime is made. This, means that spe-
cial care must be taken when studying real systems
where synchronization processes exist. The results
also show that, for the most part of the tested situa-
tions, the model responds monotonically to changes
in the synchrony rate. This behaviour is usually
taken for granted. But, the results reported in recent
works on elementary cellular automata systems,21
with which spatial evolutionary games have many
resemblances, show that the behaviour of these sys-
tems may be very different on intermediate values of
the synchrony rate.
We also found that, in general, an asynchronous
discipline supports more cooperators than a syn-
chronous one. Previous studies with the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game reported that asynchronism is detri-
mental to the evolution of cooperation when agents
use the best-neighbor transition rule. On the other
hand, the work by Tomassini et al, with the Snow-
drift game, is not conclusive about this subject:
asynchronous updating is detrimental to the evo-
lution of cooperation if the best-neighbor rule is
used, and it is beneficial if the proportional rule is
used. The generalized transition rule we applied in
our work allows these results to be understood in a
broader context: they are mainly a consequence of
the noise present in the strategy update process. This
rule allows us to tune the noise level, K, and is able
to emulate both the best-neighbor rule (K = 0) and
the proportional rule (K = 1). We found that asyn-
chronism is detrimental to the evolution of coopera-
tion in very unrealistic situations only, when noise is
absent from the decision process or when it is very
small. The results also show that, the more noise
is present in the strategy update process, the more
cooperators are favored by asynchronism. Finally,
for the most part of the tested conditions, asynchro-
nism supports more cooperators than synchronism.
The confidence in the general character of this result
is reinforced by the fact that it applies to the three
studied games and to various interaction topologies.
One of the future extensions to this work will ex-
Published by Atlantis Press 
  Copyright: the authors 
                  113
The Influence of the Update Dynamics on the Evolution of Cooperation
plore other types of transition rules. The rule we
used here emulates a complete neighborhood moni-
toring where each agent takes into account the pay-
offs of all its neighbors in the decision process. But,
a complete neighborhood monitoring is not always
possible and so we want to verify what happens in
this case. The Sigmoid 17 transition rule is a good
candidate since it also allows us to tune the noise
level present in the decision process. Another direc-
tion for this work will consider dynamic interaction
topologies22 where agents are allowed to establish
new connections with other agents and break exist-
ing ones. We hope that the results obtained under
different conditions lead us to a deeper insight about
the influence of asynchronism on the evolution of
cooperation.
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